A Brief Discussion of the Second Noble Truth of Buddhism

In Guatama Buddha’s first discourse after obtaining enlightenment, he revealed the Four Noble Truths. The Four Noble Truths remain one of the fundamental teachings of Buddhism. The Four Noble Truths are: (1) life is suffering; (2) suffering arises from cravings or desires; (3) enlightenment comes from abandoning these cravings; and (4) the way to alleviate suffering is through the Noble Eightfold Path (i). This essay only focuses on the second truth. Buddha said this about the second noble truth: “This is the noble truth of the origin of suffering: it is this craving which leads to renewed existence, accompanied by delight and lust, seeking delight here and there, that is, craving for sensual pleasures, craving for existence, craving for extermination.”(ii) There are two possible reasons why cravings are the origin of suffering.

Reason 1: Our fundamental desires are never satisfied

The first reason why desires cause suffering is that we all have fundamental desires which we can never satisfy. We value certain objects, and desire to obtain these objects. Not only do we desire to obtain these objects, but we desire to keep these objects once we obtain them. For example, I value my health. When I’m in good health I have a desire to remain in good health. Although not all of us desire good health, it is hard for someone to escape these fundamental desires, because we all desire something—like wealth, pleasure, continued existence, family, etc. . . . But why can we never satisfy our fundamental desires? The reason is because we live in a world of impermanence, and because of this it becomes impossible to maintain the object of our desire. The world around us is always in flux. Things are always changing. Heraclitus talks about the constant flux of the world when he said, “you cannot step twice in the same river” (iii) As mentioned above, we must constantly keep the objects of our desires--our fundamental desires need permanence in order to be satisfied. We desire permanence in a world which is impermanent. Our desires for permanence can’t be satisfied, and therefore we suffer. I desire to be healthy but I don’t want to be healthy for a day or a week, I want to always be healthy. The problem is that this desire can never be satisfied because my health will inevitably change. The health that I obtain will only be short lived. I will get older, my body will deteriorate, and I will lose the good health that I desire. With my desire for health unsatisfied I will begin to suffer.

The problem with this first reason—our fundamental desires are never satisfied—is that it is possible to satisfy all of your desires at a given point in time. It is not hard to imagine that for one mille-second all of my desires can be satisfied. This is true regardless of the fact that the world is impermanent. For example, right now as I’m typing this article I’m in good health. I have a desire, but it doesn’t lead to suffering, because it is satisfied. Therefore, the proposition that desires lead to suffering must not be true if the reason is because of the existence of unsatisfied desires, because it is possible to satisfy all of your desires.

One critical response to this argument is to point out the fact that was mentioned above—the world is impermanent, and the satisfaction of desires is fleeting. It is true that I’m in good health now, but I could get a cold next month. But this has no bearing on the present. Furthermore, it is not obvious that the satisfaction of my desires will be fleeting. I could curb my desires, such that I only have few fundamental desires. At this point it would not be hard to keep satisfying these few desires for an extended period of time. Even if the satisfaction of all my desires is only temporary, the proposition that desires necessarily leads to suffering cannot be true, because when all your desires are satisfied—even for a second—desires do not necessarily lead to suffering. The proposition must be changed to: “desires may lead to suffering”, which is a rather weak proposition and is not saying much.

A second critical response is that knowing that your health is impermanent is what causes you to suffer. Because you know that you are going to get old and sick in the future your desire for health always remains unsatisfied. However, do I really know that I’m going to get sick when I get older? In the future maybe medicine will reach the point that I can maintain my health for as long as I desire. I don’t know whether I will lose the object of my desire, because the future isn’t clear to me. Furthermore, this response does not capture human nature. Most people aren’t preoccupied with the future and are more concerned with the present satisfaction of desires.

A third critical response is that maybe one fundamental desire could be satisfied for a moment, but there is always an endless cycle of desires, thus making it impossible to satisfy all your desires. This rises from the Buddhist idea of Samsara--the endless cycle of desires. We constantly desire hundreds of different objects at any given time. Right now I desire to finish this article, I desire the Dodgers to beat the Cardinals tonight, I desire my family to be safe, etc. . . . Samsara is not only the notion that we have hundreds of desires. It is the idea that whenever you satisfy a desire, a new desire is created. For example, even if I satisfy my desire of finishing this article, a new desire will spring up—that people read the article and click on the advertisements. It seems that no matter how many desires we satisfy there will always be desires left unsatisfied. We don’t have x amount of desires that we can get rid of methodically. It is more like the Hydra that as soon as you chop off one of its heads a new one replaces it.

The problem with the third critical response is that it does not necessarily follow that satisfaction of desire x will lead to desiring y. The causal connection between one desire being fulfilled and another one springing up isn’t clear. I don’t see how buying a new car leads to the new desire for a house, sunglasses, or anything else. The endless cycle of desires isn’t as apparent as it seems. If satisfaction of desires doesn’t lead to new desires then all your desires can be satisfied at some moment in time. This might not be very probable, but the possibility weakens the claim that there are always unsatisfied desires.

Another point is that maybe we have all these unsatisfied desires but there is a sense of fulfillment when we accomplish one of them. If I desire to win a Nobel Prize isn’t there some sense of satisfaction--non-suffering--when I obtain my goal? Even if it is just for a fleeting moment, there is still a sense in which I’m not suffering at that exact moment. If I still have other desires which aren’t being satisfied at the time of receiving my prize, I probably wouldn’t be conscious of them. If I’m not conscious of them how could they cause me suffering? The brain can only actively think about a limited amount of things. Upon receiving the prize, I’m sure I wouldn’t be thinking about what I’m going to do next, but rather my thoughts would be joyful from satisfying my desire of receiving the Nobel Prize.

Because of the reasons discussed above, the second noble truth doesn’t seem to be saying that desires lead to suffering because there are always unsatisfied desires. There has to be more than this, because it isn’t necessary that unsatisfied desires lead to suffering.

Reason 2: The desire of objects manifests an incomplete life of suffering

The second reason why desires are the origin of suffering is because if we desire an object then we’re incomplete, and an incomplete life is one of suffering. When we desire an object we draw a distinction between ourselves and the object of desire. We cannot desire to obtain something we already have. If I desire a new laptop then I draw a distinction between myself without the laptop and myself with the laptop. And I desire it because I believe that my life would be better with the laptop. If my life would be better with the laptop then I acknowledge that my life right now without the laptop is lacking, mainly a new laptop. By desiring something, I acknowledge there is something wrong with me, I’m incomplete, and this is what causes me suffering. It is the desires themselves which cause the suffering because if we have desires then we are incomplete and an incomplete life is one of suffering (iv).

The premise that we only desire things that will make our life better isn’t self evident, and must be explained. If this premise were to be false the argument would fail because if some desires aren’t for our betterment then maybe we don’t desires things because we’re incomplete. At first glance, some of my desires seem not to be for my betterment. I knowingly desire things which are actually injurious. I desire to stay up late and play my Xbox 360 when I know it will hurt my chances of waking up on time for work the next morning. I also drink too much Diet Coke which I know will hurt my body. Aren’t these desires ones which aren’t for my betterment and therefore they cause no sense of incompleteness?

Plato writes in Protagoras “No intelligent man believes that anybody ever willingly errs or willingly does base and evil deeds.” (v) The idea is that no one can knowingly do something which isn’t for his or her betterment. The reason I drink Diet Coke is because I don’t think it is that detrimental to my health. Every time I drink one I think to myself, “one more won’t hurt me” or “the pleasure that I get from the Coke is worth the pain that it may cause me.” If I really believed that drinking Diet Coke was truly injurious to my self-betterment then I wouldn’t drink it. For example, if I knew for a fact that drinking Diet Coke was going to cause my teeth to fall out then I wouldn’t drink it. I would not desire to drink it because I would see that for my betterment I shouldn’t do so. Every desire which I act on is for my best interest, therefore I must realize that I’m incomplete or else I wouldn’t desire the object in the first place.
A counter argument is that there could be a perfect being that still had desires—in other words, desires aren’t a sign of imperfection. There could be a being that had desires, was totally perfect, and therefore doesn’t suffer. It seems that Zeus could still be a perfect being and desire for Hercules to defeat the Hydra. Zeus doesn’t desire this because his life is lacking without the defeat of the Hydra, but because as a perfect being he has compassion for Hercules.
However, it is impossible for Zeus to desire anything if he is perfect and totally complete. If a being has reached a state of completeness what more could be desired? If Zeus desires a world without the Hydra then he is suffering. He acknowledges that he is incomplete with the Hydra in the world. If he is complete then he would be indifferent to whether Hercules defeats the Hydra or not. There is also the sense that if the Hydra were to defeat Hercules then the Hydra would continue to exist in the world, and Zeus would suffer from having the unfulfilled desire of the Hydra’s death.

Desires are the origin of suffering, not because it is impossible to satisfy all of our desires. But rather because if you desire something, then you acknowledge that you’re incomplete. This realization of incompleteness, coupled with your desire to
be perfect, is what leads to suffering.

i) De Bary. William Theodore. The Buddhist Tradition in India, China, and Japan. New York: Vintage Books, 1972.
ii) Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta (SN 56.11), trans. Bodhi (2000), pp. 1843-47.
iii) Stumpf, Samuel Enoch. Socrates to Sartre a History of Philosophy. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982.
iv)Richardson, Ira. “Oriental Philosophy: Buddhism.” UCLA, Los Angeles. 12 July, 2005.
v) Plato. The Republic and Other Works. Garden City: International Collectors Library, 1978.